Just a quick thought re: the Lancet Study. Table the debate over the study's legitimacy for a moment. I wondered about its possible effects even if it got through the filter of discrediting dismissals.
I was reminded of a study about 'scope insensitivites' that lead me to think when I first saw the Lancet study that even if it makes it through the smear campaign against it (which it didn't), people who don't already care a great deal about a small # of Iraqi civilian loss of life aren't going to be particularly bothered by the 600,000 #.
See if you think the phenomena of scope insensitivity applies here. The paradigmatic study is by (Desvousges et. al. 1993.). They asked three similar groups:
Suppose X migrating birds die each year by drowning in uncovered oil ponds, which the birds mistake for bodies of water. These deaths could be prevented by covering the oil ponds with nets. How much money would you be willing to pay to provide the needed nets?
replace 'X' with 2,000/20,000/200,000 for the three different groups. Surprisingly, the $ amount doesn't change much. the 2,000 group is willing to on average pay $80, the 20,000 $78, and the 200,000 $88.
The most widely accepted explanation for scope neglect appeals to the affect
heuristic. Kahneman et. al. (1999) write:
"The story constructed by Desvouges et. al. probably evokes for many readers a
mental representation of a prototypical incident, perhaps an image of an exhausted
bird, its feathers soaked in black oil, unable to escape. The hypothesis of valuation
by prototype asserts that the affective value of this image will dominate expressions
of the attitute to the problem - including the willingness to pay for a solution.
Valuation by prototype implies extension neglect."
So here's the thought: most people have already made up their minds re: how to feel about/weight the event of a prototypical Iraqi civilian violently dying. Whether in reality there's 6,000, 60,000, or 600,000 casualties doesn't make too much of a difference in terms of their cost/benefit analysis of the Iraqi conflict.
What do you think? Imagine the Lancet study had been widely hailed as a very accurate account of the casualty rate. Would it have made a difference? Or would people have ignored it because of scope neglect?
No
(#4353)I think we have a lot more points of comparison with the loss of human life. The experiment subject didn't know how bad 2,000 or 20,000 bird deaths were -- in comparison to the bird population or other bird calamities.
"I don't want us to descend into a nation of bloggers." - Steve Jobs
I don't think it would make a difference
(#4359)because views on the war and views on the study are not independent (probably for reasons you explain above). Those who support the war actively looked for reaffirmation of their views and simply ignored the study. If the war had gone well I suspect those that opposed it would have done the same thing.
This place is my vacation.
Ignored the study?
(#4383)On all the blogs I follow where people discuss the war much (e.g., here and Harry's Place), the Lancet study was the subject of a great deal of intense debate. So who was ignoring it?
No doubt there are plenty of unreflective supporters of the war who "actively looked for reaffirmation of their views and simply ignored the study," but there are also plenty of unreflective *opponents* of the war who just as actively looked for reaffirmation of their views and simply ignored the *criticisms* of the study.
As for Catchy's basic thesis here, I think the very fact that there *was* so much and such heated discussion shows that the number of civilian deaths makes a *lot* of difference to many supporters of the war.
The trouble is, the only debates I saw that actually seemed to be getting anywhere rapidly got so technical that one would have to go out and get a degree in statistics to follow them.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
You are right
(#4398)I expressed myself incorrectly. What I meant to say was not that they ignored but that they dismissed it.
I don't know about the basic fact. I mean, would any war supporter here change their mind if they thought the 650k estimate was correct? What if it was only 300K? Is there a threshold?
This place is my vacation.
Given the early MSM and talking head predictions
(#4446)650K after three years would be a relatively small number. MedAct in the UK and a few talking heads here were in the 250K in the attack alone plus up to a million deaths from malnutrition in the post attack phase. Here's one link; most of the 2003 stuff is no longer archived or costs $$ to get...
LINK.
It is not a Lancet study, Horton merely is the self proffered vehicle to give it the widest possible publicity that MIT and Johns Hopkins would not have garnered.
I suspect the threshold for most Americans would be the comparison to US casualties. There is almost always a corollary between combatant and civilian casualties. That is one of several facts that make the study suspect. The disparity is far too great.
The K Codes explained HERE.
"Dismissed"...
(#4464)...is still too contentious, since it connotes thoughtlessness.
*Some* ignored. *Some* dismissed. But *some* disagreed and offered reasons. The third group is the one that matters.
"...would any war supporter here change their mind if they thought the 650k estimate was correct?"
Well, I can only speak for myself here. I strongly supported the invasion and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein - partly (1) because I thought that, after 9/11, the dancing & prancing-in-the-streets Arab world needed a major kick in the a**, which the campaign in Afghanistan simply wouldn't provide, and partly (2) because everything I read about the state of human rights in Iraq and the dire effects of the ongoing sanctions regime suggested that things could hardly be worse there, from a humanitarian point of view.
So *if* the 650k estimate is correct, that *might* pull the rug out from under my second reason, depending on whose assessments of the *status quo ante* one reads.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
BTW
(#4400)What's Harry's Place? I'm always interested in good blog recommendations.
This place is my vacation.
Harry's Place...
(#4450)...is a consistently engrossing English blog manned by some very smart & literate left-wing supporters of the Iraq war (as conceived, if not as executed).
The red in their banner is the red of socialism, not Republicanism.
It compares to American "war-blogs" sort of the way that Tony Blair compares to Dubbyah. For good and ill.
Here is the first of its several posts on the new Lancet study. Comments are fairly lightly moderated, so there's a lot of heat - but also a bit of light - in this and several subsequent posts on the same issue. All sides get their best licks in.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
I'll check it out
(#4501)The link you provided shows an open-minded poster but someone who does not appear to know enough to criticize the study. This in particular:
Clearly this person doesn't appreciate how polls are taken.
But it seems to be a good place. Thanks for the link.
This place is my vacation.
May not appreciate but does seem numerate... :) NT
(#4513).
The K Codes explained HERE.
It's not numerate
(#4529)The "you can't generalize from a small sample" is simply bad math.
This place is my vacation.
The legitimacy of generalization...
(#4536)...from small samples is not, strictly speaking, a *mathematical* issue.
In any case, if I may repeat myself, the real action in the thread to which I linked is in the comments, especially once "mettaculture" joins the fray.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
It's not?
(#4615)What do you mean?
This place is my vacation.
It's empirical.
(#4843)Math isn't.
Which isn't to say that math plays no role in deciding when generalization from small samples is legitimate and when it's not.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Thank you... NT
(#4855)The K Codes explained HERE.
You lost me
(#5055)What do you mean by 'it's empirical'? The reason we know a small sample can provide information about a given universe is math. The Central Limit Theorem IIRC.
This place is my vacation.
Me too
(#5060)unless probability theory isn't math?
I blame it all on the Internet
I think the question is not what you state but rather
(#4554)how accurately and / or realistically you can generalize from a small sample...
The K Codes explained HERE.
Of course
(#4613)That's why they reported the confidence interval or, in the election polls we read every day, the margin of error.
This place is my vacation.
Ah, certitude...
(#4660)Yes, indeed:
If you really believe that probability, I have a bridge -- several bridges -- I can sell you quite cheaply...
That's without even going into their highly questionable use of a pre-war 5.5 death rate, far lower than ours or western Europe's..
The K Codes explained HERE.
Ken?
(#4680)What do you mean by if I believe that probability?
As for the death rate I thought you knew the ME. Crude birth rates of that level are common in the region, some have even lower death rates than that. Of course it's lower than the US or Europe, they are much younger countries.
This place is my vacation.
Do you believe that the figures stated actually have
(#4699)a 95% probability of being correct?
I'm fully aware of the birth rate and the relative ages in the ME versus Europe or here. I'd guess the reporteed death rate in the ME averages about 4; I suspect the actual is more nearly 6. I'm also aware of the death rates caused by autocracies and the propensity to lie in numbers in the ME. I'll acknowledge that 5.5 is possible but color me dubious; in the period from 1990-2003, I suspect that was a tad low...
No way to know for sure.
The K Codes explained HERE.
If you are fully aware
(#5056)why did you bring up the US or European death rates as comparison? I'm not sure I follow you on this.
This place is my vacation.
Because that pre war death rate used is (I'm fairly sure)
(#5062)too low for Iraq which had higher education and lower birth rates than the nieighbors -- it wasn't up to Europe's death rate but I suspect it approached ours to a far greater degree than did its neigbors.
No matter, we can't prove any of that. Recall I am not challenging the math, merely the input -- and the very much ahistorical result.
We'll see, the argument will get settled someday, perhaps -- and, as usual, it'll probably lie between the poles [no pun intended :) ].
The K Codes explained HERE.
The real action...
(#4526)...is in the comments.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
A very interesting site
(#4582)Where I almost immediately found a link to this video of a recent anti-war speech by Lancet Editor Dr. Richard Horton. It's never good when you have to wipe the spittle from the chin of your champion before sending him in front of the cameras.
Anyone claiming with a straight face that the political motivations behind the study's proponents are irrelevant should take a quick peek. (Though unfortunately George Galloway's speech is cut off %^>).
I used to be with it, but then they changed what it was. Now what I'm with isn't it, and what's it seems scary and weird. It'll happen to you.—Abraham Simpson
Horton
(#4625)is not one of the authors of the study so why are his views relevant?
This place is my vacation.
Because he publicized, via his editorial position at the
(#4655)[i]Lancet[b], both studies, the earlier one and this.
He ensured both got that publicity prior to their release in the magazine -- and prior to the elections. Horton's distaste for the US and the Iraq war is no secret.
If you believe that makes him irrelevant, then you probably believe the Vice President's view on waterboarding are irrelevant...
The K Codes explained HERE.
Again
(#4683)Horton is neither one of the authors of the study or one of the reviewers. So how do his political views enter into any of this?
This place is my vacation.
Simply because he has a broader forum than is ordinarily
(#4691)afforded studies from MIT or Johns Hopkins (US institutions, BTW).
If you do not want to question why the Editor of a British publication with an international audience would promulgate two such American studies in two years and in both cases just before a US election -- and in both cases before publication in the journal he edits, that's certainly your prerogative.
As I said several days ago, that almost certainly political move by Horton did neither study a favor because in the eyes of some, it contaminated any thought of objectivity.
The K Codes explained HERE.
I have no doubt
(#4694)he did it for political reasons. I think he has admitted as much.
But since he's not the author or referee I don't see why that has anything to do with the study itself. Are you claiming the authors of the study faked or fudged the data? That's a very different type of accusation.
This place is my vacation.
I don't know how to say this more clearly. As you acknowledge
(#4708)that he released it as he did probably for political reasons, my point is that act in effect contaminated both studies in the eyes of some or many.
I am not accusing the authors of faking or fudging their data, simply saying that the politicization of the study was a tactical error and caused many questions that might not otherwise have been raised.
I do personally believe that the on the ground surveyors themselves allowed politics to intrude and further believe the cluster sample size was poorly chosen and too small. The fact that other sources have quite different numbers and that the disparity between combatant and non-combatant casualties flies in the face of historic numbers also raises questions.
The K Codes explained HERE.
You've got to be kidding me.
(#4822)You're actually claiming that the rabid anti-war bias of the editor of the magazine publishing the "study" is completely irrelevant to its credibility? Even when there apparently is no way of verifying the validity of the underlying data? Sheesh.
I used to be with it, but then they changed what it was. Now what I'm with isn't it, and what's it seems scary and weird. It'll happen to you.—Abraham Simpson
Why get mad?
(#4838)Just save a link to this for the next time you get crud about how you can't trust anything sponsored by Cato/Club for Growth/whomever they'd currently like to discredit because of bias.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
the difference is
(#4861)that the study authors are employed by John Hopkins and the Lancet was merely the *venue* for their publication.
Cato usually employs their own people. And anyway a Cato institute study is okay by me because they usually publish their methodology and data. So I can independently tell where they're being hacks. Sometimes they publish good stuff. Why can't you make the same distinctions w.r.t. the Lancet?
Club for Growth is a joke. No credibility.
I can agree that it was politically stupid to publish that study in a journal where the publisher is co-temporaneously giving emotionally charged speeches at political rallies. gives the *appearance* of political hackery.
But appearances can be misleading. there is no evidence that either the authors or referees were politically biased. Instead of encouraging your friend tomsyl there in his 10th or so irrational post on the matter, why not help him make some basic distinctions?
Unfortunately...
(#4870)The lack of political bias is highly suspect...
The K Codes explained HERE.
thanks for the link
(#4920)in all honesty I haven't followed this too closely.
The thing about peer reviewed journals like the Lancet and professionals who work at John Hopkins is that their bias is likely to show up somewhere -- either in their methodology or lousy inferences.
Unless you think the guy fudged the data. And we have no reason to think he's dishonest. In fact he lays out his position on the war and then says "our science has transcended our perspectives", meaning the data should objectively speak for itself whatever one's opinion of the war.
I don't think political hackery is a good reason for dismissing this study (there may be others).
Agreed. My point was that any politicization of such a
(#4974)report is going to cause it to be subject to more scrutiny and to ouright dismissal by some. It was IMO a tactical error on their part.
As to other reasons, I know the propensity for those in the ME to indulge in political rhetoric at any provocation and thus the impartaility of the on the ground surveyors and the answers of the respondents is somewhat suspect. Combine that with poor selection of cluster locations and the small size of the samples added to the disparate reports from other sources and the report is, IMO, suspect.
The number significantly exceeds that in other nations in majot wars of like duration when no attempt to avoid civilian casualties was made -- the reverse in fact.
I'm not dismissing it outright but I certainly am witholding judgemnet -- and leaning negatively.
The K Codes explained HERE.
Thanks to Ken White's post below I don't have to
(#5006)make any other "irrational posts" on the political bias issue. Har. Why do you engage in petty snipery while admitting in the next post that in all honesty I haven't followed this too closely? And please don't accuse anyone of being innumerate until you learn to count to ten. %^>
I used to be with it, but then they changed what it was. Now what I'm with isn't it, and what's it seems scary and weird. It'll happen to you.—Abraham Simpson
Unless you are willing to say
(#5059)that the data was faked then it's pretty clear that whatever bias the editor had is irrelevant.
If you think the data was faked for political purposes say so. That's a very different complaint.
This place is my vacation.
my interpretation vs. yours
(#4535)_the very fact that there *was* so much and such heated discussion shows that the number of civilian deaths makes a *lot* of difference to many supporters of the war._
The discussion was fueled because people *expected* the #s to make a difference. Thus war supporters got defensive and peace advocates got aggresive. But I think the expectation simply wasn't true. I don't remember anyone saying: "If this study *were* accurate I'd ammend my position".
I think Gabriel's question below is worth asking again in case anyone besides Bernard wants to chime in. For those that support the continuation of operations in Iraq, is there a threshold of civilian casualties that when crossed would make you change yourmind?
Hmmm.
(#4559)So you think war supporters challenged the Lancet study *not* because they actually cared about civilian casualties, but simply because they "*expected* the numbers to make a difference" to...well, somebody or other...
(Whereas, I suppose, war opponents *supported* the Lancet study out of pure, a-political love for humanity and/or the truth...not to be flippant, or anything...)
Again, I can only speak for myself. But the civilian casualty figures *do* make a big difference to me. The higher they go, the more convinced I become that Iraqi's, as they actually are, just can't do democracy, even when it's handed to them on a gilt platter. Which does indeed affect my attitude toward "the continuation of operations in Iraq."
Though I might suggest different changes than you would.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
2 points:
(#4457)A) You may well be right as to the applicability of scope insensitivity. And I'm a big fan of Kahneman.
B) No, it wouldn't really matter to me, but not precisely because of scope insensitivity. I expected fairly large American casualties from the war, never mind casualties amongst our opponent's people (captives?). Given that my primary thinking on this has always involved saving us much larger casualties and trouble later, I can't say that even a 600K number changes my cost/benefit. I'm not Iraqi, I know no Iraqis, I am benefitted by few Iraqis (those being faceless folks pumping oil for their own benefit). I naturally don't weight them as heavily as I weight my friends, family, people in institutions that I'm familiar with and support (i.e. the Army), etc.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
As the comments here show
(#4594)it would indeed not make any difference to those that are pro-Iraq war.
As you can clearly read anyone faintly pro is dismissing in one way shape or form the significance of the amount of casualities. Some even go so far as saying that even if the numbers of the Lancet report would be true then it still would be rather low numbers.
Which goes to show that there are 2 kinds of people. One kind who thinks any life is important and another kind that think that only the life of an American (preferable one just like them) is important.
Incorrect.
(#4623)There is one kind of person, the kind that weights the lives of people near and dear to them more heavily than those which are similar but strangers, and weights those in turn as greater than the lives of those that are both strangers and totally unlike them, and weights those in turn as being greater than actively hostile strangers. Any claim otherwise carries with it more than a whiff of hypocrisy and a lack of honest self-examination.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Emotionally
(#4632)I think that's obviously true as an emotional reaction, and I'd doubt anyone who claimed to be as psychologically torn up about each Iraqi death as they would be about a death in the family.
But isn't that just an interesting feature of our psychology, rather than something revealing about the worth of people? In other words, you don't think that innocent Iraqi deaths are actually or inherently less tragic somehow than innocent American deaths, do you? I can see that the Iraqi death toll might not make much of a base emotional impact on support for the war-- but doesn't it make an impact on a more rational level?
I oppose those Iraqi deaths
(#4635)because I believe we (the US) are fueling greater hatred which will come back in future decades to haunt my children. Thus, my opposition to Administration policies is directly linked to the future welfare of my children and grandchildren.
Besides, it also is wrong.
The proper balance between defense and welfare are the tectonic plates that lie beneath our political discourse.
Your first clause....
(#4644)....is a different kettle of fish, opposing some activity because you see it as being ultimately against the interests of you and yours. While I disagree with your assessment, the logic that follows from it makes sense.
The second clause is wholly arbitrary, and I don't think you could justify it as a consistent part of the rest of your life. Mere talk, adaptive only because it fits you in with your group. :^)
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
I think that most human activity....
(#4642)....is driven by those feelings, and that it's mostly rational. I worry more about whether my daughter will be warm and well-fed today than about whether some corresponding young lass or lad in Siberia or Patagonia will be, and I act accordingly. I rationally do not split my resources into equal shares for every kid on the planet, but hoard the vast majority of what I make for my own. I see very little behavior anywhere that makes me think that others are thinking differently, and that includes charitable giving (which generally starts when one feels that one's direct responsibilites have been taken care of, and which generally doesn't amount to a big percentage of disposable income.)
My point is that the original implicit claim that all lives should be weighted equally, and are by some class of humanity, is contradicted in whole by the human experience. Nobody apologizes for worrying more about their own. Weighting based on psychological distance from ourselves is normal, ingrained, adaptive in an evolutionary sense and so deeply a part of being human that I find claims to the contrary irrational.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Psychologically damaging vs. unethical
(#4649)I'd agree that this sort of weighting is rational when distributing resources, ie. a roof over your daughter's head, charity, etc. I'd also agree that ingrained emotional reactions to deaths have a great deal to do with our level of empathy for the victim.
What I don't agree with is that this psychological reaction can serve as a rational justification for inherent differences in moral worth. No rational ethical theory I know of makes those kinds of distinctions in theory-- that human life has inherently less value the further away from it you are.
By analogy, a person who unintentionally caused the death of a relative would be expected to greive much more intensely than someone who inadvertently caused the death of a stranger. But in any rational system of ethics, that emotional reaction alone, while understandable, would play no role in the person's culpability or the ethical value of their actions.
Rational in what sense?
(#4654)The only non-subjective benchmark I see here is whether the behavior is adaptive or not. To that end, my version appears to be more adaptive looking at human beings at any given level of aggregation. In-group is more important to your survival than out-group, and within the in-group there are always further distinctions to be made.
Edit: Additional clarification. I see no difference between "moral worth" and how you distribute resources, nor much difference between the distribution of resources and the application of force (such being counted as negative resources.) If I'm in a scarcity environment and I favor X over Y when distributing what I have control over, I've made all the moral judgement this world requires. My tears later over poor, dead Y mat be heartfelt, but absolutely meaningless. Particularly to Y.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Rational
(#4679)Rational in the sense of judging actions within some consistent ethical framework. One could of course devise an ethical scheme wherein the inherent moral value of other human beings was dependent on their proximity. But then that's something you'd need to defend-- it certainly wouldn't be like any system of which I'm aware. One of the fundamental tenets of modern ethics is that basic human worth is of a set value that does not diminish across national or regional boundaries, and that how one "feels" about committing an act is not necessarily relevant to the moral value of that act.
So if there was a button one could press that would cause a random innocent person in central Asia to die, then knowingly pressing that button would be ethically as wrong as putting a knife into him personally. Of course, the emotional reaction to each situation isn't likely to be the same. It's alot easier psychologically to press a button than it is to stab someone. And if you change the location from "central Asia" to "just down the street", the psychological reaction is going to change too. But the value of the act is the same-- murder is murder, and there's no "But I barely knew the guy" defense in any ethical theory that I know of.
Right and wrong are not perfectly synonomous with "feels good" and "feels bad". This despite the fact that there's alot of overlap, probably explainable in evolutionary terms. Right and wrong need to be determined rationally, under a system of ethics. This is why one can and perhaps should change one's views on a war because of the death toll, even if that death toll provides no emotional or psychological reaction whatsoever.
It appears to me that the ethical....
(#4800)....system I'm describing, which has precisely the characteristics you think it does, is the one best descriptive of reality. As a model, the rightness of something depending on how close the acted on is to you seems to work pretty darned well. Going to one obvious and always topical example, soldiers shooting at and killing/maiming their enemies are engaged in behavior that would not be considered acceptable by either themselves or society at large were the targets guys "just down the street" rather than other soldiers working for a foreign government or such. This is situational ethics, and it works.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Wow
(#4837)I really hope you don't get your hands on one of those magic killing buttons I mentioned.
First of all, given what I know of your politics, it's a little ironic you'd advocate an ethical theory that's "best descriptive of reality"-- where reality is meant to incorporate feelings as a paramount moral guide. Such a theory is equivalent to: "If it feels good, do it"-- wherein there could be no action that is counter-intuitively right or wrong.
Second, situational ethics is only as good as the criteria by which situations are judged. It's one thing to judge an action by its immediate context-- it's wrong to kill an innocent person without provocation, but not wrong to do so in self defense. But when you keep all other factors the same, and only change the proximity, to suggest that this changes the moral calculus-- ie., what you should do, not how you will feel-- is frankly crazy.
This is why your analogy fails, because the differences in the two situations you mention are more fundamental than just proximity. We don't condemn soldiers because they are fighting for their lives and for the safety and security of their country. It doesn't matter whether they are doing it in Chicago or Iraq-- if every other factor is the same, the location is completely irrelevant. Same goes for whether you know the people involved. Again, "I didn't even know the guy" and "He lives all the way over in China" are not valid defenses for murder.
I'd suggest that the criteria are highly dependent.....
(#4850).....on who the actors are and what their relationship to you is. Put it this way: If I'm a Brit pilot on a bombing raid over occupied Europe, there are few circumstances in which what I'm doing will be judged immoral or "bad" by myself or my contemporaries. Contrariwise, if I'm a German on the receiving end, there are few circumstances under which I will judge the pilot's actions moral or "good".
Moving back to a more traditional ethical question, I imagine the fellow who finds out his wife will pass away if she doesn't have a certain drug, which he cannot get a hold of by legal means. He breaks into the warehouse to get the stuff. I'm willing to bet that if a guard attempts to stop him by force, he'll consider the greater good, the more moral path, to lie in stopping the guard (lethally or not.) The guard, OTOH, will have acted in moral fashion in attempting to stop the thief. This may be true even if he was aware of the guy's circumstances, as the guard's circumstances may rely entirely on doing his duty and performing his guard duty well. There is no objective yardstick.
"If it feels good, do it" is only a poor first approximation. I go to work every morning even though going skiing or to the zoo is more fun. I save money for my kid's future education even though I'd like to buy a beer. Etc, etc. "Feels good" carries such a complex of weights, activities and persons that I'd say your behavior and my own would be well-modeled by it as long as we accept A) that a person can figure out their enlightened self-interest and B) that said self-interest is not so selfish as to give weight only to one single person.
Quoth Heinlein: Of all the nonsense that twists the world, the concept of 'altruism' is the worst. People do what they want to, every time. If it pains them, to make a choice- if the 'choice' looks like a 'sacrifice' -- you can be sure that it is no nobler than the discomfort caused by greediness... the necessity of having to decide between two things you want when you can't have both. The ordinary bloke suffers every time he chooses between spending a buck on beer or tucking it away for his kids, between getting up to go to work and losing his job. But he always chooses that which hurts least or pleasures most. The scoundrel and the saint make the same choices....
Edit: "I really hope you don't get your hands on one of those magic killing buttons I mentioned." Hmmn, I'm not sure why. I don't believe I've said I attach no value to any human life, or even that I attach a negative value to some Chinese fellow I've never met. I've said I apply much less weight to his life than to many others much closer to mine, but I again don't see why this implies that I'd go push the button and kill him willy-nilly. I gain nothing from his death and lose a bit (including that bit of empathy I have just because he's human even though a permanent stranger.)
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
A good measure for the relevance of criteria
(#4895)is to take two situations that are exactly the same, except for the aspect you wish to examine, and see if there's any difference between the two.
I think your criteria pretty easily fail this test-- but at this point it's pretty obvious we're talking past each other. I feel like there's still a sense in which you're conflating what you might do, how it would feel, and whether or not you should do it.
If I seem a little worried for the Chinese man at your hands, it's simply because, although I understand and empathize with the feeling that he is not so important as those you know, I haven't met many people that say this is justified by his inherently low moral value, as a human who lives far away from you. I would consider my own lack of feeling at his potential murder as an interesting psychological affect-- but would feel that murders are not objectively any more right or wrong solely because of the victim's nationality or proximity to me. If you use the subjective difference, again, you're still stuck with relativism at the end of the day.
Minor clarification.
(#4923)Psychological distance, not physical. The Chinese fellow might well be my brother-in-law, and a fine fellow in my eyes. OBL might live next door to me, but that doesn't make me value him any more. Quite the opposite, actually. I thought that we were both using that metric, but your last post makes me think we're not. The two might correlate, mind you. I know little of deep inland China or its denizens, beyond a couple on NPR interviews, either as individuals or a body; their physical isolation from me corresponds to psychological isolation from me, in that case.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Okay
(#4930)Doesn't really change my objections, but I am sorry for misrepresenting you.
Or in other words
(#4906)If we are to have objective ethical standards, one's distance from Bernard Guerrero (edit: physical, psychological, or otherwise) should not come into play.
Sorry for the third reply here
(#4918)But maybe your answer to this will help me understand your position better.
Imagine a judge sitting before two murder trials which are exactly identical except for the fact that in the second case, the judge was particularly close to the victim. Should the murderer in the second case get a harsher sentence? I know that the judge would want to give one out, based on his emotional reaction to the case-- but is that how it should be, as a matter of law? Or is there some objective sense in which a judge can hand down an impartial sentence based on the facts of the matter, and regardless of his own personal relationships?
Depends on who I am.
(#4973)To use a phrase from another branch of knowledge, where you stand depends on where you sit.
As a matter of morals, were I the second judge I think I'd be morally justified in handing out a harsher sentence.
As an outside observer, I might feel sympathy for the second judge, but might also feel that the workings of my own life and the world around me are best served by handing out a "neutral" sentence that does not take his pain into account. Both views are equally moral, I can picture myself feeling either way depending on my position in the picture.
I suppose that what it boils down to is that I don't think that there is such a thing as objective morality. It's all subjective. Moral relativism in its truest sense. This is not to say that there aren't hard and fast rules that I live by, but AFAICT they are the result of either biological or social evolution that were handed down to me pretty arbitrarily. I think, for example, that female circumcision is monstrous. And yet there are perfectly sincere West Africans that would argue that not doing such a thing to their daughters would be a disservice, encouraging immorality. Never the twain shall meet. Arguing the absolute morals of the practice is futile. In practice I apply my morals to mine, they apply theirs to theirs, and we interact only if one of us is so offended as to go in guns a blazing to impose our morals on the other (see Slavery.)
To borrow from physics, there is no privileged frame of reference. As to the law, it is less a matter of morality than one of competing interests and political power. We punish some crimes more than others because some crimes offend and frighten the body politics more than others. Conversely, things that do not frighten or offend the body politics do not become crimes at all, though they might offend my personal sensibilities or your own.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
So why be moral?
(#4893)The more that ethical theorists insist on the equal "inherent...moral worth" of all agents, and the consequences following therefrom, the more they press the question: "so why be moral?" - i.e., why should *I* adopt an impartial viewpoint when deciding what to do?
It is a very, very dangerous game to play. Because the question is unanswerable.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Well
(#4903)I'm not sure what you think the relation between the two is(inherent moral worth of humans and your question "why be moral?"). The first kind of answers the second, doesn't it?
Modern moral theory...
(#4956)...does, indeed, tend to insist on the equal moral worth of all agents.
But, if taken seriously, that has *extremely* radical implications for the way we all ought to live our lives.
So if, (like, say, Peter Singer), you're going to press the issue, you'd better be prepared to answer the question: "so why should I act as modern moral theory requires? Why should I adopt what it calls the moral point of view? Why not simply revert to a frankly *partial* point of view, and moral theory be damned?"
Trouble is, philosophers have yet to produce an even remotely compelling answer to that question.
So you might want to let sleeping dogs lie.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Can you give me an example
(#4964)Of an extremely radical implication following from the belief in essential moral worth?
I don't see how it leads to "Screw it, I'll just do what I want." At least no more so than any other ethical theory or precept. If the question is "Who the hell cares?", I'm not sure that any philosophical theory in any branch has a fully convincing response.
See #4970.
(#4971)Singer's precepts follow directly thence.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
A classic text here...
(#5003)...is Peter Singer's Famine, Affluence, and Morality.
But the belief in question is not just in "essential moral worth," whatever that means. I think you've been arguing for something much stronger.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
I'll give Singer this much, he.....
(#4970)...at least starts to approach the issue of what you would really have to do to follow the precept of equal moral worth. I think he fails, though. He gives himself outs that let him claim you should only give away half your income instead of nearly all, for instance.
From a practical POV he fails utterly, of course, since nobody even pays much lip service to such levels of abnegation. He might as well be arguing about angels and pinheads.
"Unfortunately the universe doesn't agree with me. We'll see which one of us is still standing when this is over." -- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Exactly.
(#5001)Agreed on all counts. Even Singer gets cold feet at a certain point.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Hello, pjotr.
(#4868)Such distinctive English syntax you have.
"As you can clearly read anyone faintly pro is dismissing in one way shape or form the significance of the amount of casualities..."
What utter nonsense. Will you *ever* learn to back up your claims with actual *quotations?*
Since you clearly lack the talent for even minimally charitable paraphrase, this really is an important skill for you to acquire.
By my count, at the time you posted this message, only three "pro" folks had commented on this thread, and your characterization was a grotesque defamation of all three of us.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.