Consider all of the infinitely many worlds that could possibly exist.
To say that something - anything - is "possible" is just to say that it actually *is* the case in *at least one* of those infinitely many possible worlds.
(E.g.: a flower, a cloud, you, etc.)
To say that something - anything - is "necessary" is just to say that it actually *is* the case in *all* of those infinitely many possible worlds.
(E.g.: A is A, 2 + 2 = 4, the plumber didn't come on time, etc.)
So much for defining our terms. Let's begin, then.
(1) God is, by definition, a necessarily existent being - i.e., a being that exists in all possible worlds. (See Anselm, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, etc.)
(2) Obviously, such a being is possible. (Even I lack the guts to deny that!)
But...
(3) ...if such a being is possible, then s/he/it exists in at least one of the infinitely many possible worlds.
But, but, but...
(4) ...if s/he/it exists in even one of those worlds, then by definition, s/he/it exists *in all of them*.
Therefore:
(5) God (as defined above, by The Philosophers) exists. In this world.
Q.E.D.
I'm probably reading this wrong
(#5210)but it seems a circular argument.
Where does (1) come from? What do you mean by that?
This place is my vacation.
You're a mean, mean man
(#5212)... to foist this on us poor folk. Shame on you.
I wonder, though, does the modal twist (i.e. the introduction of necessity and possibility) really anything other than bells and whistles to the standard ontological argument for the existence of god? Put less contentiously: if you think the standard ontological argument is in some sense faulty, what do you think that fault is (those faults are), and how does the introduction of 'possible worlds'-tinged modal address this fault (or these faults)?
(Personally, I'm a klutz when it comes to these twisty modal arguments, but when I hear "possible worlds," I smell a rat. My own problems with synaesthethia aside, and without claiming to really be able to put my finger on the problem, I find something fishy [can't keep track of a smelly animal without a scorecard] in unreflectively treating 'possible' as 'imaginably actual'. Of course, maybe there's some defense of 'possible world' arguments that would simply spank my ill-considered objections, and references would be appreciated.)
A man must be orthodox upon most things, or he will never even have time to preach his own heresy.
Well *that*...
(#5222)...goes without saying.
(The mean, mean stuff, I mean.)
"...when I hear 'possible worlds,' I smell a rat..."
I'll get you, for that. Just you wait.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
You are obviously more educated that I am
(#5218)but I have a few problems with your assumptions
How do you know that infinitely many worlds may exist? It may be a large number, but infinite? There's a big difference. In infinitely many worlds, anything that could possibly be must be. With a large number, no matter how large, that is not true.
Possibility has nothing to do with realization.
What's your definition of God? Omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent? One, two or all three? Capable of logical contradiction? You use a loaded term without defining it.
Also, envisioning possible worlds has nothing to do with wether they actually exist or not.
I blame it all on the Internet
"envisioning
(#5256)possible worlds has nothing to do with wether they actually exist or not". Tell that to Catchy!! :)
I had discovered a great secret. That everyone loves themselves more than they love anybody else. And if I wanted them to love me, I better be like THEM!... Ken Nordine
You're begging the question
(#5219)God must exists therefore he exists because he must.
Guard, protect and cherish your land, for there is no afterlife for a place that started out as Heaven.
Generally, the argument goes
(#5228)that g-d is that being than which nothing greater can be conceived ("id quo nihil maius cogitari potest"). A being that exists is "maius" than one that does not; therefore, that being which may or may not exist will necessarily possess the ability of existing, if g-d.
More elliptical than circular.
(Far be it from me to say "loopy.")
Dogs also bark at those they do not know. -Heraclitus
The strange thing...
(#5262)...is that the list of philosophers/logicians/mathematicians who have taken (some version of) this argument seriously reads like a who's who of the highest I.Q.'s in history.
Descartes. Leibniz. *Kurt Goedel*, for G-d's sake!
As I understand it, *his* version was discovered in his notebooks and published in the 1990's, a couple of decades after his death, since which time it has gradually established itself as the one to beat.
Personally, I've always been tempted by Dawkins' view that the ontological argument is infantile at best.
But I would never, ever, *ever*, *EVER* try to argue with the creator/discoverer of the incompleteness theorems.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
To be honest ...
(#5268)... I came up with my own logical proof of God's non-existance at some point in my Freshman year.
It went something like this (I can't remember the details): If God is an omniscient, omnipotent, being, then he would have to be composed of an infinite amount of energy. Since we know that the amount of matter and/or energy in the universe is finite, it follows that God cannot exist. QED.
Anselm's argument
(#5226)is the one you are making. IIRC, Aquinas and Duns took significantly different tacts.
More to the point, though, what in your argument requires G-d to be J-h-v-h and prevents that being who "must" exist (and what human power precisely grants us scope to require a superior being to exist?) from being Cth-lu?
Dogs also bark at those they do not know. -Heraclitus
That things exist...
(#5237)...there must be existance. Must existance have a cause, or does only effect require that? Does entropy's arrow even apply?
You're right on all counts.
(#5266)Aquinas, like Kant, dismissed the ontological argument, in his usual, perhaps somewhat peremptory, way.
And making the connection between "necessary existence" and something - anything - that we all might possibly recognize as the supposed *moral* perfection of J-h-v-h is...well, a bit of a challenge.
And yet. And yet...
Suppose it's really true that, as science and philosophy seem to be telling us lately,
"Something lies beyond the scene, the encre de chine, marine, obscene
Horizon
In
Hell.
Black as a bison..."
...shall we suppose that that "something" stands in need of moral lessons from us?
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Maybe. Maybe precisely that. -nt-
(#5376).
M Aurelius was probably right.
A Sceptic's Defense of Sasquatch
(#5238)(1) Sasquatch is defined as a large, bipedal, non-human ape that must exist in all possible worlds.
(5) Sasquatch (as defined above, by Me) exists. In this world.
Q.E.D.
Yes, that's the standard...
(#5267)...reply, going back to Gaunilon and his perfect Island.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Quad erat ...eum.....nothing
(#5241)"God is, by definition, a necessarily existent being"
LOL
Now I can help but wonder who you were thinking to fool with that one.
FYI, starting a proof with an assumption that already only can be accepted if one agrees with the result is just plain silly.
I find your lack of faith disturbing
(#5253)/
Uh-oh. Darth Livia.
(#5258)This exchange seems to be taking a dangerous turn.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Oh, pjotr.
(#5271)Calm down.
(1) Defining G-d as a "necessarily existent being" isn't my idea. It's been around for many centuries.
(2) To *define* G-d in that way doesn't *obviously* commit one to any conclusions whatsover.
That's one of the things that makes the ontological argument so interesting.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
it's interesting out of a purely intellectual exercise viewpoint
(#5346)because the counter arguments are as old as the arguments themselves.
By the way, the method used can be used both ways :
1. The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.
2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
3. The greater the disability or handicap of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.
5. Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being — namely, one who created everything while not existing.
6. An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
7. (Hence) God does not exist.
This is ...
(#5251)... where we get to indulge in an absurdist parody of the Dawkins thread, while quoting Yoda in reference to Kant.
This goes off the rails at the third premise:
(#5380)(3) ...if such a being is possible, then s/he/it exists in at least one of the infinitely many possible worlds.
This statement slyly creates the assumption that all of the infinitely many possible worlds actually do exist. But this is an unwarranted assertion. They might exist. And they might not. That is the definition of 'possible.'
So another way to construct this proof would be: if the infinitely many possible worlds actually exist, then God actually exists. But now you're called upon to prove the conditional clause rather than taking it as a given.
I think HankP pointed this out below, so consider my gauntlet to be laid down neatly next to his. :)
M Aurelius was probably right.
Yeah.
(#5410)The use of possible worlds, at least here, seems to me to imply a rather novel, counter-intuitive, and under-substantiated view of the relationship between possibility and actuality. This is what I alluded to below when I spoke of the fishiness of possible worlds; but since vinteuil responded with a vague threat, and I'm a coward, I backed off.
Oh, the shame of it.
A man must be orthodox upon most things, or he will never even have time to preach his own heresy.
Now I'm glad I didn't use the word 'rat.' :) -nt-
(#5413).
M Aurelius was probably right.
What about ...
(#5459)... the fishiness of possible salads? It seems to me that only the tuna is intuitive, even though the chicken is more substantial. A chicken-tuna-salad, on the other hand, might be possible, but who would really want to actualize it?
It was the...
(#5507)"...hear about x, smell y" thing that did it.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Can't say as I blame you.
(#5509)-nt-
A man must be orthodox upon most things, or he will never even have time to preach his own heresy.
Possible Worlds...
(#5472)...are used, at least here, as just a device for making reasoning about possibility and necessity more intuitive. The underlying point can be made without resort to such imagery: "If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P" is an accepted theorem in the standard system of modal logic (S5, I think it's called). This version of the ontological argument tries to exploit that theorem.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an interesting article on various forms of the ontological argument here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/
I hope it's needless to say that I don't really take all this too seriously.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
Say that three times fast!
(#5478)Ok I'm reading about alethic modalities now, and, when the headaches and the spinning colored dots fade here's what I got so far:
For example, if p is possible, then it is "necessary" that p is possible. Also, if p is necessary, then it is necessary that p is necessary.
I don't see how you're getting to if possible, then necessary from there. Please help. Must find aspirin. My head a splode.
M Aurelius was probably right.
Unfortunately...
(#5502)...the only way I know to make sense of the theorem in question is by invoking - (wait for it) - possible worlds.
I taught for a year in the philosophy dept. at Indiana University - an absolutely appalling nest of logicians. I've never quite gotten over the trauma of it.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.
at least you could talk classical music
(#5504)with Gary Ebbs?
I thought Mark Kaplan was a nice guy when I met him.
Logicians and philosophers of mathematics can be pretty terrible, though. I'll give you that.
Indeed.
(#5511)I gave a talk on "thick concepts," and everything was going beautifully, until SOMEBODY asked (quite politely, of course) if I would mind "formalizing the argument."
Ghastly.
.Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.